# Security & open source solutions


Robert Malmgren rom@romab.com +46-708-330378 www.romab.com

Robert Malmgren AB
Trust is good
control is better

### Outline of talk

- Description and comparison of standard security controls
  - Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and (Open)Solaris
- Description of advanced/extended features
- Example hardened network service DNS server
- Fun stuff you could do: log handling, honeypot

### Attack surfaces



### Important security concepts

- Hardening (Less is more)
- Simplicity beats complexity (Kiss)
- Defence in depth (Layered protection)
- There is always someone (something) there to get you...
- The threat is ever changing

# Security considerations

- Open vs closed source wrt security
  - When someone sell you services/products, how do they track the code base they relate to?
  - Many closed source products *silently* use OSS/ freeware component. The important question: Do they provide updates when bugs are exploited?

### Backdoor to the Linux kernel

```
if((options==(__WCLONE|__WALL)) && (current->uid ==0))
retval = -EINVAL;
```

- Addition to a system call
- Really hard to find by just eyeballing. The one finding the offending code did \*not\* realize it was a backdoor, later someone uncovered this on a mailing list
- The author did know what he/she did
- Nice (?) way to create a backdoor...

#### Backdoors

- The classic example...
  - Ken Thompsons backdoor in the UNIX C compiler
- Borland Interbase
  - Was found when Borland released it as OSS
  - Tests revealed that the backdoor was available in the commercial version for 7 year!
- "Netscape engineers are weenies". Microsoft Front Page Extensions

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

### Operating systems features

- Standard file protection
- Standard process execution environment protection
- Standard user protection
- Standard network protection
  - Additional network security features: built in filtering

# Slick security features

- FreeBSD portaudit(1)
  - makes sure you're always up to date

```
rot13# portaudit -F
auditfile.tbz 100% of 39 kB 38 kBps
New database installed.
rot13# portaudit
0 problem(s) in your installed packages found.
```

• Check all your systems from a central point

# Slick security features

- Lock downs / Virtualizations
  - Unix generic chroot (8)
  - FreeBSD jail(8)
  - Open/NetBSD systrace(8)
  - Dinux uml, xen, OpenVZ, VMWare
  - Solaris zones

# Slick security features

- Solaris capabilities / privileges
  - Fine grained authorization Better than the binary root vs user separation
  - Enables removal of setuid
  - Analyze applications need of capability with ppriv

# Advanced, really slick security controls

- SELinux\* & FreeBSD\*\*
  - MAC, MLS, Biba
  - Type Enforcement
  - Existing templates (policies), policy test tools
- Grsecurity / Apparmor
- Exec shield

<sup>\*</sup> http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/


<sup>\*\*</sup> http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en\_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac.html

# Ideas for security solutions


- Automated, inhouse security checker
- Secured DNS server
- Honeypot
- Centralized log server

Robert Malmgren AB Trust is good control is better

# Autohack style security / compliance checker









Technical experts detailed reports



Original data for (non) security tests and reports

### Internal honeypots

- Attach honeypots to strategical places on the internal network
- Honeyd can emulate a single machine or subnets of machines
  - IP stacks
  - Network services

### Internal honeypots

- Can be great early warning component (in a larger security solution)
- Good use of old (*little used*) hardware which is too limited to be useful for other functions (e.g. IDS, firewall, proxies) that requires computing power

### Secured DNS server

- Based on OpenBSD + bind
  - Hardened OS dist
- Have several partitions in /var

```
/dev/wd0a /
                                  ffs rw, softdep 1 1
 /dev/wd0e /home
                                  ffs rw, nodev, nosuid, softdep, noexec 1 2
/dev/wd0d /tmp
                                  ffs rw, nodev, nosuid, softdep, noexec 1 2
/dev/wd0f /usr
                                  ffs rw, nodev, softdep 1 2
/dev/wd0k /var
                                  ffs rw, nodev, nosuid, softdep, noexec 1 2
/dev/wd0g /var/local
                                 ffs ro, nodev, nosuid 1 2
/dev/wd0h /var/local/named
                             ffs ro, nodev, nosuid, noexec 1 2
/dev/wd0i /var/local/named/bin ffs ro, nodev, nosuid 1 2
/dev/wd0j /var/local/named/tmp ffs rw, nodev, nosuid, noexec 1 2
/dev/wd01 /var/log
                                  ffs rw, nodev, nosuid, noexec, softdep 1 2
/dev/wd0b /var/local/named/dev/ mfs union, rw, nosuid, noexec
 /dev/wd0b /var/local/named/tmp/ mfs union, rw, nosuid, noexec
```

#### Secured DNS server

• Run bind with chroot + low priv user

named -t /var/local/named/ -u named

 Use systrace to tighten down what bind can do


systrace -i -a -d /root/.systrace/ named -t
/var/local/named/ -u named

- Create systrace policy by using systrace -A named ...
- Edit systrace policy to be more restrictive than created by wizard

### Secured DNS server

- Enable NTP for time synchronization
- Use SSH/Kerberos for remote admin
- Setup local firewall with pf
- Patch and update frequently

# Log handling



Aspect tool for better manageability of logs

Tool to visually inspect syslog entries

Built on LAMP concept

# Log handling

- syslog-ng / msyslog
  - TCP based loggning
  - signatures
  - Filtering / script possibilities

### Cool distros



- Backtrack
- Pentoo
- VMWares virtual appliances
- OPHCrack Live-CD

### Summary

- Many tools exist for creation of good / cool security solutions
  - Transparance for business if they are proprietary or OSS solutions
- Important to have good, mandatory, procedures for downloading and installing OSS (and other software)
- Create complete solutions, enhance existing solutions or just pick a single function that is nice to have/use

